









On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions. 
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1. Introduction: Synthetic A Priori Infallibility
For the rationalist infallibilist, a relatively wide range of analytic and synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. Specifically, on what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’, various propositions about the external world and the self can be infallibly justified. Among others, Burge (1986, 1988, 1996) and Lewis (1996) have recently defended the a priori infallibility of propositions about the self, while Price (1953) defended the a priori infallibility of propositions about the external world around the middle of the 20th Century.      
In this paper, I evaluate the prospects for synthetic a priori infallibilism.​[1]​ In particular, focus will be restricted to what seem to be the most plausible candidates for synthetic a priori infallibility, propositions about the self or more specifically what are often referred to as ‘self-justifying’ propositions. In the course of this investigation, I reject the possibility of infallible a priori self-justification, and a fortiori, self-knowledge. 
I begin, in §2, by erecting a case against infallible a priori self-justification. In §3, I defend our position against an important internalist challenge. In §4, I augment our position by considering the implications of Williamson’s recent anti-luminosity argument for our species of anti-infallibilism, and confront further challenges to our anti-infallibilist position. In §5, I tender brief concluding remarks.
2. Self-Justification and Infallibility
Traditionally, self-justifying propositions have been at the heart of the infallibilist program in epistemology.​[2]​ In brief, a self-justifying proposition is one whose belief is supposed to be sufficient to establish its truth. Possible candidates include the following:

(SJ1) 	I am in pain,
(SJ2) 	I am feeling cold,
		and
(SJ3) 	I am being appeared to as blue.
	
In specifically rationalist terms, a self-justifying proposition is one whose belief is a priori sufficient to establish its truth. Descartes’ proposals about first person mental states (1996/1647, pp. 80ff) are the classical candidates for infallible a priori self-justification: 

(Cogito)		I think therefore I exist as a thinking thing
			and along the same lines
 (Dubito)	I doubt therefore I exist as a doubting thing.​[3]​ 
For Descartes, (Cogito) and (Dubito) are infallible self-justifying propositions since they can be believed only if they are understood (1996/1647, pp. 80-81). They are instances of direct ratiocination that supply irrevocable acquaintance with the reality of the thinking and doubting self (see Hoffmann (2011), p. 248). David Lewis (1996, pp. 564ff) similarly construes Cogito-like propositions as pure rational intuitions, minus the Cartesian metaphysics about subjects, intuitions that furnish unmediated access to the reality of the subject.  For Lewis these intuitions give rise to a specific kind of infallibility about subjective reality, an infallibility restricted to the specious present of the subject (what is experienced in the here and now) and that expires upon any kind of second-order reflection (1996, p. 559-561).​[4]​ While this view implies knowledge about the self is intrinsically ‘elusive’,​[5]​ i.e., that it is indexed to time fragments,  it sanctions an order of self-justification and knowledge intrinsically no less infallible than Descartes’.
If I am correct, though, the Cartesian/Lewisian defense of infallible self-justification doesn’t withstand close inspection. Securing warrant for judgments about one’s thoughts necessarily involves reflecting on the basis of such judgments―judgments about the content of the proto thought. Moreover, when one reflects on the warrant for a judgment regarding one’s thoughts, the thought one is reflecting on is manifestly distinct from the reflecting thought. Since the numerical independence of these thoughts seems to imply their epistemological independence,​[6]​ since if they are different thoughts they are in situ rationally inequivalent, Cogito-like propositions cannot be infallibly self-verifying either contextually (i.e., in a way that is restricted to a specific circumstance of evaluation) or unrestrictedly (see Hoffmann (2011), pp. 248-249)).​[7]​ 
To be sure, there is clear sense in which this anti-infallibilist argument converges with a fallibilist view of reason. It scarcely requires underscoring that if reason is not an autonomous vehicle of justification, it cannot justify any proposition sui generis, including synthetic propositions about the self. The problem, according to the fallibilist, is that reason lacks exactly this property. The veracity of reason, it is argued, is not something that can be established ex hypothesi: whether or not reason is being exercised correctly is not sensitive to data or evidence. What can be argued, in other words, is that there can be no criterial proof of the reliability of reason. 
More specifically, the viability of the fallibilist view of reason seems to stem from a falsifiability thesis: any proposition categorizable as a ‘truth of reason’ is in principle falsifiable. Reflection on well-worn skeptical hypotheses seems to reinforce the suspicion that there is at least one defeater available for every proposition, whether a priori or a posteriori (see Hoffmann (2011), p. 244). Consider some of the radical thought experiments concocted by skeptics to the effect that all or most of our previous beliefs could turn out to be wrong: e.g., Descartes’ evil demon hypothesis, Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, and Russell’s false memory of past experience hypothesis. It is conceded by all manner of skeptic, including the radical skeptic, that reason ab initio can register the firmest of convictions about the truth of a wide range of propositions. But as the skeptics would have it (at least provisionally), reason cannot justify, certainly not infallibly, such propositions since it cannot be excluded that undetectable deception is occurring. It is a venerable skeptical insight that there is at least one defeater available for every proposition in the form of an otherworldly skeptical hypothesis that calls into question the basic reliability of reason.​[8]​ One can always conceive of hyper-intensional ‘anti-reason’ scenarios in which reason is completely (or partially) insensitive to the truth. On the assumption that conceivability is at least a defeasible guide to possibility, it is a compelling inference that reason is corrigible. 
The fallibilist perspective, in a direct way, can be viewed as consonant with a principle informing an enormous amount of epistemological theorizing, the so-called ‘principle of relevant alternatives’, introduced by Dretske (1970). Since around the latter part of the 20th Century it has been widely maintained that the justification condition on knowledge enjoins a reliability constraint wherein justifications for knowledge claims must track their truth to some reasonable approximation (e.g., see Stine (1976), Goldman (1976, pp. 776-7) and Cohen (1988, pp. 94-105)). The reliability criterion requires rational justifications aimed at knowledge to preclude relevant alternative inferences from or explanations for the justificatory premise(s). Defined in the most general terms,

(RA)	for any knowledge claim K, the justificatory premise(s) J for K must rule out all of K1, K2, K3…, Kn as alternative inferences from/explanations for J, where K1-Kn are deemed relevantly close alternatives to C. 

For example, to know that the car 50 yards away is a Toyota, the justification for this claim must rule out its being a Nissan, Acura, Honda, or any other closely relevant alternative. 
On any proposed conception of the principle of relevant alternatives, (Cogito) and (Dubito) clearly fail the test of infallibility. Since (i) the radical skeptical hypotheses in principle reduce the probability that (Cogito) and (Dubito) are true (in fact, if true, they falsify these propositions), and (ii) since (Cogito) and (Dubito) are infallibly warranted only if such warrant confers on them a probability of 1 (the highest possible probability), (i) and (ii) undermine the infallibility of these propositions on any possible conception of relevant alternatives. There is naturally the important question whether the notion relevant alternatives can be made clear (e.g., see Cohen (1988, pp. 94ff) and Williamson (2000, pp. 174 and180) on this point), that is, sufficiently sharpened to identify propositions that are legitimate falsifiers in satisfactory depictions of various epistemic situations. This is a pivotal concern, for instance, for certain contextualist epistemological ambitions. For present purposes, though, relevant alternatives can be left intentionally vague: a crude conception of this notion that largely reflects first-order intuitions about the extension of knowledge, rationally justified belief, and the like yields the intended result.
3. Internalism and Conceptualization 
One reply to the present rebuke of infallible a priori self-justification rejects our fallibilist premise on the basis of a thesis about conceptualization. On this basic approach, the infallibility of Cogito-like propositions is a function of bare conceptualization. In brief, what is claimed in this case is that there is a unique link between conception and apperception in some species of conceptualization, i.e., certain instances of conceptualization about the self. Taking (Cogito) and (Dubito) as examples, conceiving of the ‘I’ as a thinking or doubting thing is supposed to imply immediate awareness of this ‘I’, on this outlook. Since conception of the ‘I’ as a thinking thing or doubting thing engenders direct acquaintance with the reality of this ‘I’, one can unmistakably affirm its existence. 
Needless to say, this outlook is of a piece with the internalist account of infallible self-justification, articulated and defended by Descartes, McGrew et al. (2007), and others.​[9]​ Such internalism endorses a definite and highly debated thesis regarding intentional content: the content of at least some concepts is ‘subject-internal’. Internalism of this class thus decrees some mental states are transparent in the general sense that they are fully ‘open to view’ or ‘revealed by introspection’ (more on the notion of transparency to follow). Since reflection is unnecessary to recover the properties of such transparent mental states, indefeasible judgments, the internalist argues, can be made about them.
	Naturally, internalism about intentional content and rational justification is a highly contentious position, a position reproved by the likes of Burge, Putnam, Kripke, and Williamson. In arguendo, though, it is important to scout internalism’s prospects for delivering a defensible account of infallible a priori self-justification. On first glance, internalism appears ill-suited to underwrite infallibility claims about a priori propositions such as (Cogito) and (Dubito). The most fundamental problem with the variety of internalist infallibilism under consideration stems from its employment of the notion bare conceptualization. It is quite commonly surmised that bare conceptualization, as employed by the internalist infallibilist, is fundamentally problematic. In particular, it is vexing how one can directly apprehend a concept, or the properties of a mental state, in a way that its content can figure in a definitive judgment about it.
Consider the application of this point to the traditional candidates for infallible a priori self-justification: Cogito-like propositions. As discussed, (Cogito), (Dubito), and close cognates are considered, by Descartes and others, to be propositions with which one enjoys direct acquaintance. They take the form <I’m experiencing/feeling/being-appeared-to like that, therefore that>. In this case, since that is a demonstrative whose referent is immediately intuited, it picks out a primitive feature of reality. But this seems to makes such propositions uninteresting. Instead of taking the form <I’m experiencing like that and not like that>, they take the form <I’m experiencing like that>. In this case, that is not divisible, decomposable, or analyzable into separate parts (compare with Williamson’s definition of ‘primeness’, 2000, pp. 65ff). Any ‘proposition’ lacking this property, it might be argued, is necessarily non-descriptive and non-factual, and consequently, devoid of cognitive import. The upshot, on this view of the situation, is Cogito-like propositions are epistemically barren since (i) they lack cognitive content, and for this reason, (ii) they can’t be vehicles of rational justification.
This argument bears an unmistakable resemblance to a widespread anti-foundationalist polemic (e.g. see Sosa (1980), p 6). The polemic, glossed in the broadest of terms, runs as follows:

P1: Mental states that give one direct contact with reality lack cognitive content.
P2: A mental state without cognitive content cannot support any proposition, raising its credibility in comparison with alternatives.
P3: Mental states that do not give one direct contact with reality provide no guarantee against error.
P4: All mental states either do or do not give one direct contact with reality.
C: No mental state can be an infallible justifier.

Here, judgment is reserved on this general anti-foundationalist argument, or similar variants, since it presupposes foundational propositions must be infallible or provide a guarantee against error, a very controversial thesis.  
4. Infallibility and Luminosity
4.1 Luminosity and Reliability
The case against Cartesian infallibilism about first person propositions such as (Cogito) and (Dubito) can be brought into sharper focus via exploration of Williamson’s semi-technical notion luminosity. Williamson employs the notion of luminosity to refine the conception of transparency in application to first person mental states and other allegedly primitive cognitive phenomena. If luminosity faithfully represents the notion of transparency under consideration, as I contend, it supplies a more stringent test of the internalist’s claim to infallible a priori self-justification. Application of the test, in this case, can thereby potentially illuminate the principal reasons for our rejection of infallible a priori self-justifying propositions.     
Williamson defines luminosity as follows (2000, p. 95):

A condition C is defined to be luminous if and only if (L) holds:
(L) For every case α, if in α C obtains, then in α one is in a position to know that C obtains.


A couple points of clarification are in order. First, this definition does not rely on any conception of ‘knowledge’: Williamson is happy to work with an intuitive concept of knowledge, one whose vagueness matches the spectrum of our intuitions in its application (2000, pp. 100-101).​[10]​ Second, Williamson’s definition does not exploit the substantive, and likely problematic, meta-requirement on luminous conditions to the effect that for any luminous condition C, in every case α, one must know that C obtains.​[11]​ Rather, the more moderate requirement proposed is that one always be in a position to know C obtains for C to be luminous, i.e., that one must in principle be capable of recognizing when C obtains whenever it does (where being in a position to know is left deliberately vague in the same way as knowledge and reliability).  
	Williamson argues that virtually no conditions are luminous (2000, pp. 96ff).​[12]​ The heart of Williamson’s anti-luminosity case is a restricted reliability constraint on rational justification revolving around truth-tracking.​[13]​ In general terms, the requirement is that one shouldn’t believe a proposition, at least a proposition about luminous phenomena, in any epistemic situation sufficiently similar to a situation where that proposition would be false (Williamson, 2000, pp. 98ff). In other words, if one believes a proposition P in an epistemic situation S where P is true, but P is false in some epistemic situation S* sufficiently similar to S, one lacks rational justification for believing P in S. In view of the indisputable limitations of human cognition, Williamson reasons, it is highly likely that no non-trivial condition, and per force mental state, is luminous. 
For Williamson no non-trivial luminous condition meets the reliability constraint since the possibility always exists one is in such a condition yet not in a position to know it. For any proposed luminous condition C, there is always a case α where one is not able to recognize C obtains. In short, a reliability constraint in the form of a nominal principle of relevant alternatives is supposed to rule out non-trivial luminosity since for any condition C there is an alternative construal of C or a counter-example to C triggered by counterfactual case α. Since a luminous condition is luminous all the way down, since of necessity it “… always shines brightly enough to make its presence visible” (Williamson, 2000, p. 95), Williamson rejects the likely candidates for non-trivial luminosity (e.g., feeling cold, feeling pain, being appeared to as if such-and-such). 
Bracketing Williamson’s universal anti-luminosity argument (against any purported luminous condition), consider its application to the specific proposal for luminosity under consideration: occurrent first person mental states. While traditionally some first person mental states have been thought to be luminous since being in such states seemingly implies being in a position to know this, such an appearance looks dubious. For any mental state M there seems to be a case α in which one is in that state yet not in a position to know it. Considering (Cogito) as a case in point, there will be at least one case α in which one is thinking, even when suitably alert and conceptually sophisticated (up to a minimum threshold), yet not in a position to know it. One can imagine a series of states, M0, M1, …Mn, in which one goes from Cogito Awareness (CA) to lacking such awareness. If CA is a luminous condition then in going from CA to ~CA, one must in exact concurrence go from being in a position to know one is thinking to not being in a position to know one is thinking (see Williamson, 2000, p. 97). On the assumptions that (i) human cognition is limited in certain ways and (ii) the transition from CA to ~CA is gradual, one’s confidence in making judgments from M0-Mn must steadily decline.​[14]​ Considering the waning of one’s doxastic confidence in this case, in the transition from CA to ~CA (represented as M0-Mn) there is insufficient reason for maintaining one will always be in a position to make the necessary discriminations. In particular, in any infinitesimally minute interval, Mi → Mi+1, it can hardly be denied one will not be in a position to know one is CA in Mi, when one is not in a position to know one is ~CA in Mi+1. 
On this way of thinking, there will always be a counterfactual alternative to CA, a condition in which one exists as a thinking thing but is not in a position to know this. For Williamson, as remarked, the point can be generalized to all non-trivial mental states―first and third personal (2000, pp. 96-8). On Williamson’s view, feeling cold, being appeared to as blue, or any other candidate for a primitive mental state lacks luminosity no less than thinking I exist as a thinking thing. Whether generalizable or not, though, the force of the anti-luminosity argument in application to occurrent first person mental states is difficult to dispute.
4.2 Internalism and Luminosity    
Unsurprisingly, this line of argument comes under fire on a refined construal of internalism. From an internalist standpoint it is natural to maintain that in some instances there is a necessary connection between believing a proposition and its truth. For example, if the content of the proposition <I am a thinking thing> is completely subject-internal (in the sense specified above), its belief seems to guarantee its truth. For the internalist this is a special type of belief―one formed demonstratively. It has the form ‘I am experiencing like that’, where that picks out the state of one’s experience (see McGrew et al. (2007), p. 132). The belief’s infallibility in this case stems from the fact that it enjoins a kind of direct reference or acquaintance with the mental state in question, wherein the mental state is a constituent of the belief. As McGrew et al. put it (2007, p. 132), ‘The claim in question is that beliefs formed via the relevant sort of reference or acquaintance are infallible; what secures their epistemic status is the mode of their formation…” (italics in the original).​[15]​ This suggests the whole question of degrees of confidence or justification doesn’t arise in connection with beliefs about propositions such as (Cogito) and (Dubito). Since beliefs about some first person mental states, such as those figuring in (Cogito) and (Dubito), determinately self-refer by their mode of formation, the degree of confidence one has in their truth is of no consequence. 
	The most promising reply to the considered internalist defense of infallible a priori self-justification involves a more thorough treatment of the reliability constraint on rational justification. The internalist contention that there is a class of beliefs infallibly justifiable in virtue of demonstrable relations between beliefs and their propositional objects, while undoubtedly coherent on the face of it, clearly violates anything like a universal reliability requirement of the kind prevalent in contemporary epistemology,​[16]​ and the restricted reliability requirement evinced by Williamson’s definition of luminosity. If a belief can be infallibly justified exclusively in terms of the way it was formed (e.g., via mechanisms of direct reference), it is not constrained in any way by relevant alternatives―sufficiently close cases in which the belief would be false but one would not be in a position to recognize this. By declaring a set of beliefs (perhaps a fairly small set) demonstrably justified via their mode of formation, the internalist infallibilist self-consciously abandons the thesis that in all cases beliefs/propositions/etc. need be constrained by reliable, truth-tracking mechanisms (see McGrew et al. (2007), p. 119).  
To be sure, relinquishing the reliability constraint incurs significant costs. Moreover, while obviously short of unassailable, it is highly misleading to label the reliability constraint an “unargued intuition”, as McGrew et al. (2007, p. 119) have. One concern with the view that some beliefs are impervious to reliability restrictions is that it severs the connection between rational justification/knowledge and truth (see Cohen (1988), p. 279). Such an outlook, for starters, has the seemingly counter-intuitive consequence that it fails to exclude ‘accidental’ or ‘lucky’ instances of knowledge. In particular, rejecting a universal reliability constraint involves, to some measure, abjuring the factivity of knowledge, the requirement that if one knows P then P. The factivity of knowledge, inter alia, answers to the objectivity of knowledge by ensuring the propositional objects of knowledge are true facts. Absent some kind of reliability mechanism, there seems no guarantee the extension of ‘knowledge’ will coincide with the extension of ‘true fact’. 
But the merits of a universal reliability constraint notwithstanding, the question of present import is whether some beliefs can be justified/known ‘unreliably’, i.e., self-verifying beliefs vying for infallibility. While it may turn out some beliefs can be rationally justified or known unreliably, the proposals for infallibility on offer seemingly cannot be among them, contra internalist infallibilism. If any beliefs are in fact subject to reliability constraints, this set surely must include the candidates for infallibility. Ostensibly, one cannot secure infallibility without a safeguard ensuring one’s justification for a belief reliably tracks the truth, that the justification for the belief (ceteris paribus) exists if only if the belief is true. Infallibility requires the highest degree of consilience with the factivity condition. To maintain, then, that (Cogito), (Dubito), or any other candidate for a priori infallibility can be rational justified or known in esse, insulated from reliability constraints, looks spurious in the extreme.
It is quite generally recognized, even by a host of internalists (e.g., Descartes (1996/1647); Bonjour (1996), pp. 53-5; Chisholm (1977); Foley (1987)), that a reliability constraint is a precondition of the kind of factivity and objectivity underpinning infallible knowledge. Descartes, for one, understood this necessity as confirmed by his postulation of an independent criterion to certify the truth of immediate, clear and distinct conceptions such as (Cogito) and (Dubito). Descartes expressly acknowledged that clear and distinct conceptions (‘C&Ds’), pro tem, aren’t ineluctably sensitive to the truth since one can’t be sure in any given case that a C&D conception isn’t false. Assenting to propositions only when they are clearly and distinctly conceived is in itself not a truth guarantor since it is possible an omnipotent malicious being is deceiving us about the veracity of C&D conceptions (or for that matter, that we are brains in vats, have been given ‘anti-reason’ pills, are victims of Alpha Centaurian cognitive scientists, or the like). For this reason an independent standard is required to certify the basic fidelity of reason, to guarantee the truth of our C&D conceptions: a perfect supernatural deity―the Judeo-Christian God. 
In the end, then, the internalist infallibilist’s contention that there are primitive states of belief yielding infallible a priori self-justification or knowledge is unfounded. The thesis that there can be primitive states of belief, of the kind in question, effectively supposes there are beliefs of the form <this is the way things seem or feel> or <this is the way things are being experienced> that serve as immediate infallible justifiers. But in such cases the referent of the demonstrative this looks to be essentially intractable: since it is fundamentally deictic, this does not designate a context-independent state of affairs (i.e., a state of affairs identifiable independently of person, place, time of utterance, or any other contextually salient parameter). Most importantly, the referent of this, to all appearances, is completely subject-dependent, implying it doesn’t even have a context-relative semantic value―a semantic value stable across some set of contextually salient variables. It follows that the objects of such ‘knowledge’, isolated from reliability constraints, are devoid of cognitive content and effectively nebulous from the standpoint of epistemology. 
On this outlook, it follows that the primitive states of belief supposed to underwrite infallible a priori self-justification turn out to be purely phenomenological states. Declarations to the effect that it seems, appears, or feels to me that such-and-such, insofar as they concern the putative content of immediate experience or the character of bare sentiment, lack any of the normative properties typically of interest to the epistemologist. The first person propositions such as (Cogito) and (Dubito) whose infallibility the internalist infallibilist tries to secure emerge, on reflection, as phenomenological posits outside the bounds of traditional normative epistemology. 
5. Concluding Remarks
If we are correct, a subject’s access to mental states cannot be transparent, luminous, or ‘fully introspectable’ in a way that engenders rational indefeasibility. In consequence, contra Descartes (1996/1647), Burge (1986, 1988), Lewis (1996), and McGrew et al. (2007), (Cogito), (Dubito), or any other first person proposition of significant cognitive interest cannot be infallibly justified, i.e. justified in a way that is truth-entailing. 
This verdict, for all intents and purposes, is a corollary of the fallibilist view of reason, the authority of which is buttressed by formidable skeptical and reliabilist insights. If reason is corrigible, its exercise can never infallibly justify any proposition, self-verifying or otherwise. On the other hand, no more wide ranging inferences can be drawn for the possibility of a prior justification, synthetic a priori justification, or a priori self-justification/knowledge. While it might turn out a compelling dismissal of a priori knowledge, or a particular variety of a priori knowledge, can be developed along similar lines of reasoning to those invoked here, final judgment on the matter demands broader inquiry (see Hoffmann (2011), p. 252). ​[17]​ 
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^1	  I undertake a similar project in Hoffmann ((2011), pp. 246-251)).
^2	  I elide throughout an important distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification, which can be safely ignored for present purposes.
^3	  One needn’t be a rationalist, though, to be an infallibilist about self-justification/knowledge. Russell (1912, p. 242) famously erects an empiricist defense of infallible self-knowledge, arguing that one can be directly acquainted with oneself as a thinking thing via observation, sensory experience or “the naked eye” (as he puts it). More recently, Parent (1997) has also defended the possibility of infallible a posteriori self-knowledge. The main lines of argument advanced here do not directly address the possibility of infallible a posteriori self-knowledge, though it can’t be ruled out they have some bearing on it. 
^4	  It might be argued that Lewis is not an infallibilist about the self since he merely maintains that one can rightfully ignore certain counterfactuals to Cogito-like propositions, not that we can deny their possibility. I’m not sure this interpretation can be sustained since, for a contextualist, ignoring a counter-factual to a Cogito-like proposition within a given context seems tantamount to denying its possibility within that context (which would imply Cogito-like propositions can be infallibly justified within a context). In any event, I leave open that Lewis is not an infallibilist in the Cartesian sense, and so may not be the direct target of the present investigation, meaning our focus may be restricted to the classical Cartesian infallibilist about the self.  
^5	  For Lewis ‘knowledge’ is an indexical that picks out a time-sensitive property. Since the normative status of knowledge ascriptions varies across contexts in accordance with such criteria as a subject’s risk of error and what is at stake vis-à-vis the knowledge claim, knowledge ascriptions have a temporal semantic value. While contextualist accounts of knowledge of this general kind have their detractors (for discussion, see Stanley (2005, pp. 84ff)), they are rapidly becoming a mainstay of normative epistemology (proponents include Kaplan (1989, p. 504), Cohen (1988, p. 97), Goldman (1976, pp. 776-7), Stine (1976, section 3) and Derose (2002, 2009)). Such contextualisms, rightly or wrongly, are widely maintained to have numerous advantages over their invariantist counterparts (both classical and subject-sensitive invariantism) including their superior treatment of questions related to skepticism, high stakes vs. low stakes knowledge ascriptions (both first and third person), and the ubiquitous lottery dilemma (for discussion, see Stanley (2005), pp. 84ff) and Derose (2009), chapters 2, 4, 6 and 7)).
^6	  This and the preceding claim are obviously the crucial premises in our argument. They will be defended in the course of our development of a fallibilist view of reason, in this section and the next, on which they seem to turn.   
^7	  This does not rule out that (very) weakened Cogito-like propositions such as <thought exists> or <doubt exists> cannot be infallibly justified. Such propositions, though, plainly have little cognitive significance.
^8	  There is a closely parallel route to fallibilism about reason via Cartesian circle-style arguments according to which the exercise of reason requires presupposing its veracity. One can never be sure reason has not foundered, on this view, since the possibility cannot be completely ruled out that one is mistaken about the veracity of reason itself, e.g., when one is deceived by an omnipotent malevolent force. The exercise of reason cannot conclusively establish the falsity of the skeptical hypotheses, the reasoning runs, since the reliability of reason itself depends on their falsity. While serious exploration of Cartesian circle arguments is beyond our scope, their close relationship to skeptical arguments purporting the fallibility of reason should be borne in mind.  
^9	  That said, Burge (1986, 1988, 1996) and Lewis (1996) defend a similar kind of infallible a priori self-justification, minus commitment to internalism of the type to be discussed in the text (or any other substantive variety of internalism).
^10	  Williamson makes a similar claim about relevant alternatives (he also makes a similar claim about reliability (2000, p. 125)). For Williamson, though, since knowledge is a primitive mental state (one not decomposable into separate conditions), it is not even possible to define it in traditional terms, in terms of something like the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing. As he puts it, “Given that the concept knows is mental, every analysis of it of the standard kind is therefore incorrect as a claim of concept identity, for the analysing concept is distinct from the concept to be analysed” (2000, p. 30). On the other hand, Williamson is agnostic (perhaps bordering on skeptical) about the possibility of defining relevant alternatives. 
^11	  The requirement would constitute a limiting case of the knowledge of knowledge thesis (‘KK’) according to which if one knows a proposition P then one knows that one knows P. Williamson finds KK problematic since knowledge is a primitive mental state, and like virtually all such states (indeed, virtually all mental states), it fails the test of luminosity (see Williamson (2000), pp. 115ff and 125 for an expansive discussion of KK).
^12	  He leaves it open that some trivial mental states may be luminous. In fact, Williamson maintains luminous conditions are by definition trivial or ‘purely phenomenal’ (2000, p. 15). As Williamson remarks, “If the phenomenal is postulated as comprising those conditions of the subject, whatever they are, which are accessible to the subject whenever they obtain . . . then the phenomenal is empty” (p. 178). More on this conception of the phenomenal, or something akin to it, to follow. 
^13	  Williamson is agnostic in this case about the nature of reliabilist processes: whether they are causal mechanisms, appropriate environmental conditions, doxastic dispositions, cognitive abilities, intellectual virtues, or the like. He can thus be interpreted along the lines of Cohen (1988) and Bonjour (1996) as maintaining reliable processes are in some sense truth-conducive. Discussion of reliabilism is hereafter restricted to this innocuous formulation, a formulation seemingly neutral vis-à-vis externalist/internalist epistemological disputes.      
^14	  The first assumption appears uncontroversial and in need of little support. There is no dispute about the general limits of human cognition, and one is at pains to deny that such limits apply to our ability to make fine-grained determinations about the contents of all mental states, including primitive first person mental states (though opposition to this view is confronted in the course of the foregoing discussion). The second assumption, while doubtless pre-reflectively appealing, is far more contentious and has been called into question by some detractors of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument (e.g., Wai-hung Wong (2008)). It is addressed, at least implicitly, in the foregoing discussion of the relation of direct reference or acquaintance in application to beliefs about mental states.   
^15	  Strictly speaking, McGrew et al. provide such a defense of a priori infallibility only for some analytic propositions (2007, chapter 5). Evidently, though, they advocate the a priori infallibility of synthetic propositions such as (Cogito) and (Dubito) since they defend the infallibility of the entire realm of the a priori (2007, p. 133).  
^16	  That said, one needn’t be an internalist to reject a universal reliability constraint. A number of commentators whose affiliation with internalism is tenuous at best levy arguments against a universal reliability constraint at least partially by way of rebuttal of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument (e.g., Brueckner and Fiocco (2002;) Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004)). 
^17	  I’d like to thank John Turri and Henry Jackman for helpful comments on much of the material in this article. Thanks also to audiences at the CPA and APA Pacific annual conferences for constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this article. 
